Short answer: Iran needs 30 days for the production of enough Weapon-Grade Uranium (WGU) for 5 nuclear bombs, plus 2 to 6 months to make the completed nuclear weapons.

The 30 day time frame assumes that Iran only uses their Fordow uranium enrichment plant, which is deeply-buried in the desert near Qom, Iran. At ~260 feet below ground, Fordow is well protected from a missile or bomb attack. And Iran is building a deeper more protected site near Fordow, literally under a mountain.

In mid June of 2024, Iran notified the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) that they will be adding 8 of their most advanced (IR-6) uranium centrifuge cascades to the Fordow plant. Previously, 2 IR-6 cascades were installed there. With 8 more, the total is over 1,700 centrifuges across 10 cascades. A cascade is a set of interconnected centrifuges. An IR-6 cascade can turn 20% UF6 (uranium gas) into 60%, or 60% UF6 into 90+% WGU gas.

By the end of June, according to news reports, 4 of those additional 8 cascades were already installed. That process of installing the first 4 cascades (out of 8 total) took only 2 weeks. The last 4 of the 8 additional cascades have likely been installed since that time, as we are now in early August, 5+ weeks later. With those 10 centrifuge cascades — 2 previously installed; 4 more reported to have been installed in June; and the last 4 assumed to have been installed by now — Iran can make enough WGU for 3 nukes in 10 days; 2 more nukes by the end of that first month; 4 more nukes by the end of the second month, for a total of 9 nukes worth of WGU.

According to the Institute for Science and International Security:
* “In the first one-third of a month, Fordow could produce in 10 IR-6 cascades 92 kg of WGU, enough for three nuclear weapons (assuming 25 kg WGU used per weapon);

* “By the end of first month, it could produce a total of 145 kg of WGU, enough for five nuclear weapons;

* “By the end of second month, it could produce a total of 225 kg of WGU, enough for nine nuclear weapons.” [The Institute]

Note well that this scenario uses only the centrifuges in the deeply-buried Fordow enrichment plant, and not the greater number of centrifuges from the vast facility at Natanz. A full-scale break out using both facilities would allow Iran to continuously produce more WGU and nuclear devices, month after month, year after year. And the breakout solely at Fordow would be difficult to detect. Iran could make an excuse to refuse entry to the IAEA, and then make enough WGU for 5 nukes in only 30 days. The rest of the work to make the nukes could be carried out in secret. Iran could even return to IAEA monitoring after making WGU for 30 days.

Such a 30-day “sneak out” would be politically almost impossible to stop. Fordow is unlikely to be attacked by the U.S. in a contentious election year. And Netanyahu is under great pressure from his own government over the Gaza war. A conventional military strike on Fordow, a location near the Muslim holy site of Qom, could spark an all-out war in the Middle East. So Iran could make enough WGU for 5 nukes in one month, with little risk of military intervention.

But a longer breakout, which would likely be detected by the U.S. and Israel, would provide enough WGU to make a total of 9 nuclear weapons in two months. Then the question becomes how long will it take to turn that 90+% enriched uranium gas into metal, form it into the right shapes for an implosion nuke, and complete the entire rest of the complicated nuclear device. According to David Albright of the Institute for Science and International Security (ISIS), about 4 months of the estimated 6 additional months of work needed to make completed working nuclear weapons can be done in advance of obtaining the enriched uranium. That leaves only 2 months of work on the device, after the WGU is enriched to 90+%.

With one month to make enough WGU for 5 nukes, and 2 more months to complete the weapons, Iran only needs, at a minimum, 3 months to make 5 completed nuclear weapons. As a worst case scenario (for Iran), those 5 nukes could be completed in less than 7 months (1 month for the WGU and up to 6 months for the work on the device). But going forward, the WGU for 9 nukes, enriched in 2 months, can provide 9 nuclear weapons in less than a year.

How many nukes does Iran need, in order to be able to use only 1 nuke in anger? Five. If Iran has only 1 nuke, and uses it in an attack, the military response will be unrestrained, destroying the nation. With 2 or 3 nukes, Iran could use 1 and then threaten to use the remaining 1 or 2, in order to forestall a massive military counterstrike. The problem for Iran, though, is that their enemies will try to find the location of the remaining 1 or 2 nukes, destroy them with missiles, leaving the Iran again open to a massive counterstrike. But by the time Iran gets to 5 nukes, they could use 1 and then move the remaining 4 nukes around in a shell game, making it unlikely that all 4 devices could be destroyed in a counterstrike. This leaves Iran’s enemies unable to launch a full-scale counterstrike, even in response to a nuclear attack by Iran, as they would fear a second nuclear attack.

The Current Escalation in the Middle East

Iran is very close to obtaining nuclear weapons, and military intervention to stop them is now next to impossible. And yet Israel is provoking Iran with repeated attacks. Israel bombed the consulate within the Iranian embassy complex in Damascus, Syria. Israel also is widely thought to have killed Hamas political leader Ismail Haniyeh. That assassination occurred in Tehran, when leaders from various nations had gathered to welcome the newly-elected President of Iran.

Israel, like every nation, has a right to defend itself. But bombing a consulate or embassy, and assassinating a political leader while he is visiting another nation, are beyond the moral limits of the self-defense of a nation. Such acts should be condemned also as being contrary to international law.

But my main point here, in this article on Iran’s nuclear program, is that Iran could have several working nuclear bombs before the end of 2024, so it is not only immoral and illegal, but also very dangerous to go to such lengths to provoke a soon-to-be-nuclear Iran. These provocations could push the Iranian leadership into a unified resolve to begin making nuclear weapons.

When Iran obtains 5 or more nuclear weapons, the first problem is that many of the nations in that region of the world will want to ally with them. There is an inherent increase in political power, not merely in military power, when a nation obtains nuclear weapons. Any alliance with a nuclear Iran increases the influence of that nation or group. Seeing this increase in power along with the building of alliances under Iran’s nuclear banner, the populace in that region (i.e. the Arab/Muslim nations of the Middle East and northern Africa) may revolt against their current governments. They will prefer a government that will ally with a nuclear Iran. A second and much more ominous “Arab Spring” may occur (at any time of year).

The other problem is that war becomes more likely if a nuclear Iran cements alliances with extremist groups or with newly-extremist nations in the region. The increase in power from both the possession of nuclear bombs and an increase in the potential number of potential troops makes a war with Israel and the Western nations more likely.

Iran can make 5 or more nuclear weapons before the end of 2024. And then the whole world becomes a much more dangerous place.

Ronald L Conte Jr