Here is the latest Institute for Science and International Security (ISIS) Report (Nov. 20, 2023) on Iran’s nuclear program. The ISIS Report is based on the Nov. 13 and Nov. 15, 2023, IAEA reports.

Previously, per the Sept. 2023 Report, Iran could make enough Weapon-Grade Uranium (WGU) for one nuclear weapon in 12 days. In a full-scale break out, Iran could make enough WGU “for six nuclear weapons in one month, eight in two months, nine in three months, and ten in four months.”

In the current assessment, per the Nov. 2023 Reports, Iran could make enough Weapon-Grade Uranium (WGU) for one nuclear weapon in 7 days. In a full-scale break out, Iran could make enough WGU “for six nuclear weapons in one month, eight in two months, ten in three months, eleven in four months, and twelve in five months.”

The ISIS Nov. 20 Report warns that Iran has greatly reduced the ability of the IAEA to monitor its nuclear program, by expelling 8 of the top IAEA inspectors from Iran, and by its previous removal of some of the monitoring cameras and equipment. This reduces the ability of the IAEA to detect a nuclear break out (a rush to make WGU for nuclear weapons).

The ISIS Report warns of the possibility of “diversion to a secret enrichment plant” of 20% and 60% enriched uranium gas. Another risk is the diversion of the advanced centrifuges to such a hypothetical secret uranium enrichment facility. The Report notes that Iran has reduced its installation of advanced centrifuges, indicating that either “Iran is producing fewer centrifuges than expected, implying possible manufacturing difficulties, or is keeping newly produced machines in unmonitored storage instead.” Such unmonitored stored centrifuges could be diverted to a secret enrichment facility:

ISIS Nov. 20th Report:
“The absence of monitoring and surveillance equipment, particularly since June 2022, has caused the IAEA to doubt its ability to ascertain whether Iran has diverted or may divert advanced centrifuges. A risk is that Iran could accumulate a secret stock of advanced centrifuges, deployable in the future at a clandestine enrichment plant or during a breakout at declared sites. Another risk is that Iran will establish additional centrifuge manufacturing sites unknown to the IAEA. Iran has proven its ability to secretly move manufacturing equipment to new, undeclared sites, further complicating any future verification effort and contributing to uncertainty about where Iran manufactures centrifuges.”
[…]
“Concern about Iran’s installation of advanced centrifuges at an undeclared site increases as the 60 percent HEU stocks grow. Such a scenario is becoming more worrisome and viable, since a relatively small number of advanced centrifuge cascades would suffice for the rapid enrichment of the 60 percent HEU to weapon-grade. This hybrid strategy involves the diversion of safeguarded HEU and the secret manufacture and deployment of only three or four cascades of advanced centrifuges. With greater uncertainty about the number of advanced centrifuges Iran is making, there is a greater chance of Iran hiding away the requisite number of advanced centrifuges to realize this scenario.”

Iran now needs only a very short time to make enough WGU for multiple nuclear weapons: 6 in one month, 12 in five months. Additional time would be needed to make the working nuclear weapons from the WGU. But that time was previously estimated at only 2 to 6 months. Then there is the possibility that Iran has a secret enrichment facility, outfitted with advanced centrifuges and supplied with stocks of 20% or 60% uranium gas. If so, then a nuclear breakout could already be underway.

Iran removed 8 of the IAEA’s top inspectors from Iran on Sept. 16th of this year. That was over 2 months ago. A secret nuclear breakout could not make as much WGU per month as a public breakout, as it would rely only on secretly installed advanced centrifuges. However, if Iran could make as few as two nuclear weapons in secret, they could next conduct a public breakout, with less fear of military intervention. And once Iran has 5 or 6 nuclear devices, the breakout would be practically unstoppable for fear of a nuclear war.

Note: Let me just add here that I believe Iran is currently in the midst of a secret breakout. See my previous post: Is Iran using the 2023 Israel Hamas War as cover for a Nuclear Breakout?. When will Iran announce that they have nuclear weapons? Possibly within the next 6 months or so, once they have at least 5 or 6 working nukes.

Ronald L Conte Jr