Latest IAEA Report

The 22 May 2013 IAEA report on Iran’s nuclear program presents the following. As of May 2013, Iran possessed 6357 kg of 5% enriched Uranium-235 and 182 kg of 20% U-235. But the total amount of 20% U-235 enriched by Iran is 324 kg. The latter number was reduced by 142 kg because Iran has (supposedly) converted much of its 20% U-235 into a uranium oxide metal, which is not useful, in that form, for a nuclear bomb program. According to the IAEA, about 140.8 kg has been converted from 20% U-235 to uranium oxide, and the rest (less than 2 kg) was down-blended to a lower enriched state. The conversion of 20% U-235 gas to uranium oxide metal takes place at the Fuel Plate Fabrication Plant at Esfahan in Iran.

As of 15 May 2013, Iran declared that 53 IR-1 cascades (sets of centrifuges) are purifying uranium at Natanz. In addition, 4 cascades of the more advanced IR-2m centrifuges have been fully installed at Natanz, with installation work underway for another 14 cascades of Ir-2m centrifuges.

The IAEA reports that Iran is continuing its research and development efforts on newer centrifuge designs, including IR-4, IR-5, IR-6 and IR-6s models. But none of these advanced designs are currently enriching uranium to any significant extent.

Iran has 2 cascades (operating in tandem for greater efficiency) of IR-1 centrifuges purifying 20% U-235 at Natanz.

Iran has 16 fully-installed cascades of IR-1 centrifuges at Fordow, but only 4 cascades (arranged in tandem: 2 sets of 2 cascades) have been operational. These have produced just over 60 kg of 20% U-235 in just under 6 months, for a production rate of over 10 kg/month. The whole facility then, has a potential production rate of about 40 kg/month (at 5 kg per tandem and 8 tandems).

The total number of deployed IR-1 centrifuges, at Natanz and Fordow combined, now exceeds 16,000 centrifuges.

See the most recent analysis of the May 2013 IAEA report on Iran by the Washington D.C. think-tank “ISIS” (Institute for Science and International Security) here: May 22, 2013 — ISIS Analysis of IAEA Iran Safeguards Report.

Breakout Potential

Iran possesses 182 kg of 20% U-235, which is sufficient for a nuclear breakout of 1.7 months, according to a past ISIS report (Iran’s Evolving Breakout Potential, p. 17-18). According to the same report, a 1.4 month breakout would require 190 kg of 20% U-235. But since Fordow produces 20% U-235 at a rate of over 10 kg/month, and Natanz adds another 4 to 5 kg/month, it will take Iran less than 20 days to produce another 8 kg or so of U-235, raising the total to 190 kg, and allowing for a 1.4 month nuclear breakout. The figure of 182 kg is stated by the IAEA as of 10 May 2013. Therefore, as of 30 May 2013, Iran will have enough enriched uranium for a 1.4 month breakout.

When a “red line” is discussed for Iran’s nuclear enrichment, a figure of 240 kg of 20% U-235 is sometimes stated as the line. That quantity of enriched uranium would be sufficient for a one month breakout, without reconfiguring the IR-1 centrifuges at Natanz to the tandem configuration. (Such a reconfiguration would be one indication of a breakout, and might be considered another red line.) However, with 180 to 190 kg of 20% U-235, Iran is capable of breaking out at the present time. So one red line has already been crossed.

The quantities of 20% U-235 needed and the rapidity with which Weapon-Grade Uranium (WGU) can be made from it, as stated in the ISIS report of 8 Oct 2012, is based on a certain number of cascades at Natanz, and based on Fordow operating at full capacity. According to the current IAEA report, Fordow is ready for full capacity operation, and Natanz now has many more centrifuges. The additional cascades of IR-1 centrifuges at Natanz do not actually help in a breakout scenario, unless they were reconfigured to the more efficient tandem set-up. Otherwise, too much 20% U-235 would be required as feed stock, and the time to complete the enrichment would not be reduced.

However, the new IR-2m cascades being installed at Natanz are of great concern. These are more efficient than the IR-1 models, and so they require less feed stock to produce a given output of WGU, and they produce it at a much faster rate. The May 2013 IAEA report states that 4 IR-2m cascades are fully installed at Natanz. The 4 operating cascades of IR-1 centrifuges at Fordo produce about 10 kg/month of 20% U-235. The same number of IR-2m cascades, should out-produce Fordo by three to five times. Once the 18 total cascades (4 currently installed plus 14 being installed) are operational, the time for a breakout by Iran falls further. It is conceivable that Iran could breakout, using Fordow and the IR-2m cascades at Natanz, in well under one month, with less than 200 kg of U-235.

Cheating on IAEA Oversight

Many tracts on Iran’s nuclear program seem to assume that whatever the IAEA states on the subject is the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth. There is little or no consideration given to the possibility of deception by Iran or error/omission by the IAEA. What is the basis for such an assumption? Iran has previously admitted, publicly, that it uses deception to protect its nuclear program:

“In a rare admission two weeks ago, the head of Iran’s Atomic Energy Organization, Fereydoon Abbasi, was quoted in al-Hayat saying the Iranian government had provided false information in the past to protect its nuclear program.” (The Algemeiner, 7 Oct 2012)

And ISIS has repeatedly warned that Iran might have a third secret uranium enrichment facility:

“A troubling possibility is that Iran could deploy the IR-2m in a third, possibly secret, enrichment facility. Iran claims it does not have to inform the IAEA about a new nuclear facility until it is nearly complete, and Iran has been ambiguous about whether it is building one.” (ISIS report of 16 Nov 2012)

“Iran has also not provided information about the construction of ten additional enrichment plants, of which it claims site selection for five plants has been decided. The construction of a third enrichment plant is increasingly suspected.” (ISIS report of 22 May 2013)

See also: Is Iran Building a Third Enrichment Plant? (4 June 2012).

With the latest IAEA report (22 May 2013), the possibility of a secret facility using the advanced IR-2m centrifuges has become even more likely. For it is now evident that Iran has developed its IR-2m centrifuges to the point where they can manufacture and install hundreds of these advanced centrifuges in multiple cascades. The IR-2m appears to be ready for full-scale use in making enriched uranium. A third secret facility with less than a thousand of these advanced centrifuges could conduct a nuclear breakout in secret. Iran would then be able to make the 90% U-235 gas that is considered ‘weapon-grade’, without the world knowing that it has crossed this penultimate red line. In such a case, Iran would be cheating on IAEA oversight by failing to inform the IAEA of a nuclear production site, as required under the nuclear non-proliferation treaty, to which Iran is a signatory.

Another “cheating” scenario involves the unusually high quantity of 20% U-235 gas that has been converted into uranium oxide metal, a form that is not useful in a nuclear weapons program. Iran has spent many years and billions of dollars, and has endured immense harm to its economy from ever-tightening sanctions, in order to make uranium gas enriched to near-20% purity. Are we to believe that Iran would next take 140.8 kg out of 325 kg of that 20% U-235 and turn it into a form that has only very limited use? If you accept that Iran is enriching uranium in order to make nuclear bombs, then you must be highly skeptical that Iran would turn more than 40% of its precious stockpile of 20% U-235 gas into uranium oxide metal. In all caution and due diligence, we must consider two alternate possibilities.

First, Iran may have deceived IAEA inspectors by obtaining uranium oxide plates from a source outside the nation (such as China). The 20% U-235 gas would be fed into the machinery for conversion to the oxide form only while inspectors watched. The inspectors would also verify the existence of the oxide plates that result. But inspectors don’t stand and watch the entire process, which takes many days. Thus, Iran has the opportunity to cheat on inspections by feigning conversion to the oxide form. Much of the 20% U-235 gas could then be taken to a third secret facility for enrichment to WGU, or stored somewhere in anticipation of a breakout (if no such third facility exists).

Second, even if we suppose that Iran did in fact turn 140.8 kg of 20% U-235 gas into uranium oxide, they are able to convert it back into gas form in a relatively short period of time:

“More advanced centrifuges, with three to five times the capability of current machines, are worrisome. And Iran’s conversion of some 20-percent-enriched uranium into a less controversial oxide form provides little assurance. This type of uranium could be converted back into centrifuge feedstock within a week.” (Washington Institute)

So any uranium in oxide form remains available for a breakout. But in my opinion, the first of these two possibilities is more likely. A deception that makes 20% U-235 gas available for use at a moment’s notice would be favored by Iran over a deception that puts that valuable material a week or more out of reach.

Now suppose that the time required to convert uranium oxide back into gas form takes several weeks, rather than the one or two weeks that some sources state. Even so, Iran might break out with its existing near-20% stockpile, while simultaneously converting the oxide back into 20% gas. Once the existing supply of 20% U-235 is used up, a new supply from the oxide form would be ready for use. In this case, the conversion of the uranium from oxide to gas would essentially add zero time to a breakout.

“The growth of the centrifuge program would allow Iran to more rapidly break out and produce a nuclear weapon with its 3.5 percent LEU hexafluoride and the existing 19.75 percent LEU hexafluoride. It could simultaneously reconvert any fresh 19.75 percent LEU oxide back into LEU hexafluoride for use in producing subsequent nuclear weapons.” (ISIS report 15 June 2012)

The same report warns the West against a “a false sense of confidence” resulting from the high quantity of 20% U-235 that has been converted to oxide form.

Iran currently has 182 kg of 20% U-235, plus the oxide metal that resulted from the conversion of 140.8 kg of 20% U-235. The process of conversion and later reconversion is not perfect, so some U-235 is lost. But even if the process lost 20% in each conversion/reconversion, Iran would have 100 kg of additional 20% U-235. So the real total is not 182 kg, but more like 282 kg of U-235.

Red Lines

Soon, it will be too late (if it is not too late already).

* At its current IAEA verified total of 182 kg of 20% U-235 gas, Iran has enough 20% uranium for a 1.7 month breakout.
* By the end of May, Iran will have at least 190 kg of 20% U-235 gas, which is enough for a 1.4 month breakout.
* The possible reconversion of uranium oxide metal into gas form, in several weeks or less, puts another 100 kg of U-235 gas or so within Iran’s reach, for a total of over 280 kg, thereby exceeding the most commonly-stated red line of 240 kg of 20% U-235.
* The possible existence of a third secret uranium enrichment facility is itself a red line, especially if that facility is up and running with the more advanced IR-2m centrifuges.

In addition, the continuing installation of hundreds of IR-2m centrifuges at Natanz could reduce breakout times below a level that would be detectable. Inspections from the IAEA occur every week or two. But Iran could easily make an excuse to delay inspections for 2 or 3 weeks, without triggering a military strike on its facilities. So the installation of IR-2m cascades should also be considered a redline, one that is currently in the process of being crossed.

by
Ronald L. Conte Jr.
Roman Catholic theologian and
translator of the Catholic Public Domain Version of the Bible.