In my previous post, Iran Crosses Nuclear Breakout Threshold: January, 2013, I estimated that Iran would have enough near-20% U-235 gas from their nuclear program in order to initiate a 1.7 month nuclear breakout beginning on or about 16 January 2013. As Iran enriches and stores more and more kg of 20% uranium, the length of time for a breakout shortens:

1.7 month breakout (180 kg) — 16 Jan 2013
1.4 month breakout (190 kg) — 30 Jan 2013
1.3 month breakout (200 kg) — 11 Feb 2013
1.0 month breakout (240 kg) — 29 Mar 2013
0.9 month breakout (250 kg) — 09 Apr 2013

A nuclear breakout is a rush to make enough weapon-grade uranium (WGU) to supply one or more nuclear bombs with fissile material. As long as Iran is enriching to a maximum purity of about 20%, the regime can claim to be enriching uranium solely for peaceful purposes. The 20% uranium can be used to make medical isotopes. However, as the ISIS report of 15 June 2012 explains, Iran has already produced far more near-20% uranium than it could possibly need for peaceful purposes.

The only tenable explanation for why Iran is spending billions of dollars and enduring hash sanctions in order to accumulate an ever-increasing quantity of 20% U-235 gas is that Iran is preparing for a nuclear breakout. At some point in time, Iran will refuse to continue to allow IAEA inspectors into its facilities. Iran will break free of IAEA oversight and use its stockpile of 20% uranium in a rush to make enough WGU for one or more nuclear bombs.

I estimate that on or about 30 January 2013, Iran accumulated enough 20% uranium gas for a 1.4 month breakout. The estimate is based on the 8 Oct 2012 ISIS report analyzing the amount of time that Iran would need for a breakout, based on the growing size of their stockpile of 20% U-235 gas, and on IAEA assessments as to how much 20% gas they add to their stockpile each month. As of this point in time, Iran could make enough WGU for one or more nuclear bombs (depending on the yield of the bombs) using existing stockpiles of 20% uranium gas in 1.4 months. By late March, Iran could breakout in as little as one month. And by early April, Iran could breakout in less than one month.

Sabotage?

Recently, a news report circulated claiming that the Iranian nuclear facility at Fordow was struck by sabotage, and that multiple explosions damaged the facility severely and trapped workers underground.

The IAEA took the unusual step of commenting on the claim: “We understand that Iran has denied that there has been an incident at Fordow,” the Israeli website Arutz Sheva Wednesday quoted IAEA spokeswoman Gill Tudor as saying. “This is consistent with our observations.”

The Institute for Science and International Security (ISIS), a Washington, D.C. think tank, released satellite images taken a day after the alleged sabotage. The ISIS analysis of those images concludes that no such sabotage occurred. Day after Alleged Sabotage at Fordow: Hardly the Expected Emergency Response

If any similar sabotage were to occur at any time, it would likely set the Iranian nuclear weapons program back by months, if not years. In my view, as Iran accumulates more and more near-20% U-235 gas, shortening the time to a breakout, the only way to stop Iran from obtaining nuclear weapons is with force: either significant sabotage of both nuclear facilities or a military air strike.

However, if Iran has a third nuclear facility, in addition to Fordow and Natanz, one that is covert, Iran may already have begun a covert nuclear breakout. If so, the most likely breakout scenario involves a small underground facility that uses the newer IR-2m centrifuges, instead of the IR-1 centrifuges currently operating at Fordow and Natanz. According to the ISIS website (Iran’s Advanced Centrifuges), the IR-2m centrifuges “are projected to have an output that is about 4-5 times greater than the current output of the IR-1 centrifuges.”

Advanced Centrifuges

Are the IR-2m advanced centrifuges ready for large scale production of enriched uranium gas? Perhaps. On 31 Jan 2013, the Associated Press reported that Iran has notified the IAEA of their plans to install a new unit of centrifuges, at Natanz, consisting of thousands of IR-2m centrifuges. The report asserts that this unit could contain as many as 3132 centrifuges, which in my understanding would be 18 cascades with 174 centrifuges in each cascade (18 * 174 = 3132).

The Fordow facility has 16 cascades (16 * 174 = 2784 centrifuges) and produces about 20 kg of near-20% U-235 gas per month. A 16-cascade unit of IR-2m centrifuges would be 4 to 5 times as efficient, producing 80 to 100 kg of 20% uranium per month. An 18-cascade unit could theoretically produce up to 112 kg per month. But since these centrifuges are new, and Iran lacks experience operating them on a large scale, the lower figure of 80 kg/month is more likely, even with 18 cascades.

Such a facility, a unit of 16 to 18 IR-2m cascades, would be able to produce enough 20% U-235 gas for one SQ of WGU (Significant Quantity — enough for one medium yield, or a few low yield bombs) every 2 months (20 kg from Fordow and 80 kg from the new unit at Natanz is 100 kg/month). Worse still, if used to process an existing stockpile of 20% gas, those advanced centrifuges could produce one SQ of WGU in only about two weeks. Iran could stop purifying uranium gas to 3.5%, and use its existing stockpile of 3.5% gas and its over 10,000 IR-1 centrifuges to make 20% uranium, and then use the IR-2m centrifuges to make WGU. In short, the completed installation of one unit of IR-2m cascades would greatly accelerate the Iranian nuclear program.

What To Watch For

Suppose that Iran decides to breakout. What would be the indication that a nuclear breakout were occurring?

1. Turning away IAEA inspectors

IAEA inspections do not necessarily occur on a schedule. They can request inspection at any time. But in general, the IAEA inspects Iran’s nuclear facilities about once every two weeks. The next inspection at Fordow is said to be today (31 Jan 2013). So we will have unequivocal confirmation concerning the alleged sabotage there. For a breakout to occur, Iran would need to deny IAEA inspectors access to its facilities. If a breakout were well-timed, they could begin right after the most recent inspection, and have about 2 weeks before they would need to turn away inspectors. Iran would then need to buy about another 4 weeks or so of time, by promising to allow inspections again soon, by lying about the reason for turning away inspectors, etc. Six weeks is 1.5 months, which is now (as of 30 Jan 2013) enough time for a nuclear breakout (given a stockpile of about 190 kg of 20% gas).

2. Conversion of more 20% U-235 to oxide plates

My contention is that Iran is already undertaking a covert breakout. With a third secret enrichment facility and IR-2m centrifuges, Iran need only find some excuse, some type of deception, to divert large amounts of 20% gas to that facility. In summer of 2012, Iran claimed to have turned about 96 kg of 20% gas into oxide plates, for use in making medical isotopes. I think it is highly unlikely that Iran willingly gave up a large portion of its 20% stockpile, attained at great cost, to convert to a form that is useless for its nuclear bomb program. Therefore, I suggest that Iran deceived the IAEA and diverted most of that 20% gas to its third secret facility.

If so, then Iran will need to commit the same type of deception again, finding some excuse to divert another large quantity of 20% gas to the third facility. The most likely excuse would be the manufacture of more uranium oxide fuel plates.

UPDATE (10 Feb 2013)
Reuters reports: “Diplomats accredited to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in Vienna told Reuters that Iran had apparently resumed converting into fuel small amounts of higher-grade enriched uranium….”

The new amount being converted to uranium oxide is not yet known. But if the amount is substantial, my interpretation would be that Iran has moved more uranium gas to a third covert facility, and has deceived inspectors into thinking it was converted into uranium oxide fuel plates.

3. A sudden change in Iran’s posture vis-à-vis the IAEA and the West

Once Iran begins a breakout, they will have a very strong interest in preventing a military strike while the breakout is underway. Since a non-covert breakout would be fairly obvious, despite official denials, Iran would need to take a much different political posture to forestall such a strike. I’m not sure what this might include, but it would be a sudden departure from their current political position toward the U.S., Israel, and the IAEA.

Summary

Iran is now very close to a nuclear breakout (if one is not already underway covertly). They are currently capable of breaking out, and all that remains is the decision as to its timing. The longer they wait, the shorter the time needed to breakout. Current breakout time is 1.4 months. The next IAEA report is due in late February. At that time, we should have more information on Iran’s current capability and its breakout potential.

[updated 2/1/2013]

by
Ronald L. Conte Jr.
Roman Catholic theologian and
translator of the Catholic Public Domain Version of the Bible.