There are three fonts (sources) of morality: three things and only three things that make any human act, i.e. any knowingly chosen act, moral or immoral:
(1) intention,
(2) moral object,
(2) circumstances.
An act is moral (ethical) if and only if all three fonts are good. Any one bad font makes the act immoral (unethical). This post is about the first font, called intention.

All three fonts of morality proceed from the human will to three different types of ends:

1) intention — The will chooses an intended end, which is the reason or purpose for choosing the act

2) moral object — The will chooses a particular type of act. The type of the act, in terms of morality, is its inherent moral meaning; it is the essential moral nature of the act. And this meaning or nature of the act is nothing other than the inherent ordering of the act, in and of itself, toward a good or evil proximate end (the moral object).

3) circumstances — The will chooses to act in the knowledge that actions have consequences, and in the knowledge that this particular act has good and bad consequences that can be reasonably anticipated, with their likelihood and their moral weight. If the reasonably anticipated bad consequences morally outweigh the reasonably anticipated good consequences, then the font of circumstances is bad and the choice of such an act by the will is a sin.

So the will (or we could say, in some sense, the intention) is involved in each font. However, when we say “intention” in Roman Catholic moral theology, we mean the intended end (first font). The intentional choice of an act, whose type is determined by the moral object, is distinct from the choice of an intended end. The intentional choice of an act, in the light of its reasonably anticipated consequences, is distinct from the choice of an intended end.

First font: The intention (or intended end) is in the subject; it is in and of the person who acts. The moral object is in and of the act itself, by virtue of its intrinsic ordering toward that end.

Second font: The intentional choice of a particular type of act includes, at least implicitly, a choice of the inherent moral meaning of the act (its ordering toward an end) and a choice of the moral object. Choose a type of act, and you are necessarily always choosing the act, its inherent moral meaning (or essential moral nature), and its end (moral object).

So the intended end is distinct from the intentional choice of the act itself.

When a person intends moral evil as an end or as a means to an end, such an intention is immoral. Thus, the first font would be bad and the act will always be a sin, as long as the intention remains disordered. If a person intends harm to another human person as an end, such an intention is always immoral. Some harm can be tolerated, and even intended, as a means — for example, when a physician intends to amputate a limb to save a life — but harm as an intended end is always immoral.

If your intention is the only thing making your act immoral, change your intention. If you have difficulty changing your intention, pray. But in any case, you may not act with a bad intention. To do so is always a sin.

by
Ronald L. Conte Jr.
Roman Catholic theologian and
translator of the Catholic Public Domain Version of the Bible.