The Jerusalem Post reports: Russian FM: Iran wouldn’t use nuclear weapons on Israel. The Russian foreign minister has stated that Iran would not attack Israel, “especially because there are millions of Arabs and Muslims in Israel”.
I’m skeptical about that reason. A more compelling reason is that the radioactive fallout would affect neighboring Arab/Muslim nations. The terrible consequences of this fallout would cause those nations to turn against Iran, diminishing Iran’s power in the region. So, as much as Iran would like to wipe Israel off the map with nuclear weapons, they cannot do so. What they can do is attack the U.S., dividing us from Israel, and then attack Israel with conventional weapons.
Reuters reports: “New York City’s police chief, Ray Kelly, warned that a possible conflict between Iran and Israel is a particular area of concern, given New York City’s large Jewish population.”
Iran is unable to attack Israel with nuclear weapons. Therefore, they will attack New York City instead. NYC has the largest number of Jews, outside of Israel, of any city:
“The New York metropolitan area is home to the largest Jewish population in the world outside Israel. After dropping from a peak of 2.5 million in the 1950s to a low of 1.4 million in 2002 the population of Jews in the New York metropolitan area grew to 1.54 million in 2011.” (Wikipedia)
In addition, NYC is the location of the United Nations headquarters, the organization that was instrumental in founding the modern State of Israel. The U.N. has also cooperated with the U.S. in bringing sanctions against Iran. And it is the largest city in the United States. By attacking NYC, Iran in effect hits three targets: Jews, the U.N., and the United States.
See my previous posts: Reasons why Iran will nuke New York City, not Israel and Nuke Map — possible location of Iran’s attack on U.S.. I have been warning about this attack on NYC and about Iran’s major role in World War 3 at the start of the tribulation, in my books of eschatology for many years now.
The JTA (Jewish Telegraphic Agency, a new organization) reports:
“Mitt Romney said that he and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu would employ the same ‘test’ for Iran’s nuclear program but a strike was ‘a long way’ off. ‘My own test is that Iran should not have the capability of producing a nuclear weapon,’ Romney, the Republican presidential candidate, told CNN on Tuesday. ‘I think that’s the same test that Benjamin Netanyahu would also apply.’ ” (JTA)
The Romney campaign has now updated their website, according to ThinkProgress.org
“Governor Mitt Romney’s campaign has updated its website to include a new so-called “red line” on Iran’s nuclear program. Previously, the site’s Iran section claimed that a President Romney would not tolerate Iranian possession of a nuclear weapon. The updated version of the site hinges on Iran’s nuclear weapons capability” (ThinkProgress)
My take on this change is that, if Romney is elected in November, Iran will know that it has only 3 to 4 months until a probable military strike on its nuclear facilities. Iran will need to obtain three or four nukes (or at least enough WGU for 3-4 nukes) by that time. And according to the latest ISIS report, that time frame is entirely possible: Iran needs 200 kg of 20% U-235 gas, one month to reconfigure its centrifuges, and then only a couple of weeks (0.3 to 0.4 months, according to ISIS) to make enough 90% U-235 gas (37 kg) for 25 kg of Weapon-Grade Uranium. Zero point three months is 10 days. Zero point four months is 12 days.
The 25 kg of 90+% U-235 metal is based on a range of 15 to 25 kg in the finished bomb, plus about 5 kg lost to processing the metal into a hollow sphere (20 to 30 kg), with 25 kg as the average. But can Iran make a nuke with less than 20 to 30 kg of U-235 metal?
| How Much Weapon-Grade Uranium does Iran need? | |||
| Weapon Yield | Level of Technical Expertise | ||
| in kilotons | low | medium | high |
| 1 kt yield | 8 kilograms | 4 kilograms | 2.5 kilograms |
| 5 kt yield | 11 kilograms | 6 kilograms | 3.5 kilograms |
| 10 kt yield | 13 kilograms | 7 kilograms | 4 kilograms |
| 20 kt yield | 16 kilograms | 9 kilograms | 5 kilograms |
| Values rounded to nearest 0.5 kilograms Sources: IranWatch.org, “Iran’s Nuclear Timetable“, updated 6 Sept 2012. and: Thomas B. Cochran and Christopher E. Paine, “The Amount of Plutonium and Highly Enriched Uranium Needed for Pure Fission Nuclear Weapons,” (Washington, DC: Natural Resources Defense Council, revised April 13, 1995) | |||
If Iran were willing to settle for a lower yield, they could make a bomb with 4 to 9 kg of uranium metal. But they need to make enough 90% U-235 gas before the U.S. or Israel strikes. A Romney win in early November would lock-in Iran’s time table to obtain nuclear weapons and probably even to use them.
For Iran, the more effective military strategy is to strike NYC with a nuclear bomb first, before the U.S. strike’s its nuclear facilities. Then Iran can threaten a subsequent nuclear attack with their remaining bombs, to forestall a U.S. counter-attack. Waiting until the U.S. or Israel strike first is not their best option. They would lose their nuclear facilities. If they strike NYC first, the U.S. might refrain from retaliation out of fear of a second attack.
Romney’s red line is nuclear capability, which is essentially the same as Netanyaho’s read line. Once Iran has enough 20% U-235 gas, they can make 90% WGU gas, and then WGU metal, and then a bomb rather easily and quickly. Obama’s current red line is possession of a nuclear weapons. That might change as the last days of the election unfold. But currently, a Romney Presidency is more dangerous to Iran, more of an unknown, and more likely to prompt an early strike on the U.S. by Iran.
My assessment is worse than that of ISIS: Iran has a third secret uranium gas enrichment facility. They have diverted the 90+ kg of 20% U-235 gas (that was supposedly turned into an form unusable for making a nuke) to the third facility. They may already have enough 90% U-235 gas (perhaps even enough metal) for one nuke. Iran’s next move is to create some type of cover story, so that they can move the rest of their 20% U-235 gas to the secret facility.
Some of the recent news stories are looking at this situation through rose-colored glasses.
“Iran would currently need at least two to four months to produce enough weapons-grade uranium for one nuclear bomb, and additional time to make the device itself.” (Reuters)
This assessment assumes too much.
It assumes that Iran will use the 25 kg of weapon-grade uranium metal for one larger nuke, rather than 3 to 4 smaller nukes. For Iran, it is vastly more advantageous to have multiple smaller nukes than one larger nuke. With the larger bomb, once they use it, they are no longer a nuclear power and are vulnerable to a counter strike. If they have 3 or 4 nukes, they can use one, and forestall a retaliatory strike by threatening to use the remaining nukes.
It assumes that Iran did not deceive the IAEA when Iran supposedly took 90+ kg of its 20% U-235 stockpile (about half of all it had at the time) and converted it to unusable form (an oxide). Iran has publicly boasted about using deception in its nuclear program. The IAEA inspectors are only present about twice a month. It would be easy for Iran to divert that 20% U-235 gas to a covert facility for enrichment to 90%.
The 2 to 4 month period to make enough WGU gas assumes that Iran does not have a covert facility for enrichment, did not deceive the IAEA inspectors about its 20% U-235 stockpile, and has not reconfigured its centrifuges to the more efficient tandem set-up. (Actually, as of 30 Aug 2012, Fordo already had 4 cascades arranged in 2 tandems.) The claim that additional time would be needed to make a nuclear device, after obtaining enough WGU, assumes that Iran does not have multiple nuclear devices already prepared, lacking only the nuclear material (which is hollow spheres of 90+% U-235 metal).
The Times of Israel says: “In goodwill gesture, Iran shifts uranium to fuel stock” Times of Isreal.
They are referring to 71 kg of U-235 gas that the latest ISIS report (based on IAEA assertions) says was converted to uranium oxide, essentially making it unusable for further enrichment and use in a weapon. The 71 kg is out of 189 kg of 20% U-235 produced as of August 2012. However, another 25 kg was also scheduled for conversion to oxide, so the total is closer to half of the 20% U-235 stockpile that Iran worked so hard to obtain.
It is simply unbelievable, it is an astounding feat of naiveté, for anyone to assert that Iran gave up half of its stockpile of 20% U-235 for the sake of some good will. Who originally made this claim, that was picked up by news agencies around the world? — an Iranian member of Parliament. What is entirely believable is that Iran deceived the IAEA, and did not convert that 20% U-235 to unusable form.
Since Iran purifies 20% U-235 at a rate of about 15 kg/month. As of October, they probably already have enough 20% U-235 for a nuclear breakout. And if they have a third covert enrichment facility, a nuclear breakout has already begun.
The red line has been crossed, and the politicians did not notice.
by
Ronald L. Conte Jr.
Roman Catholic theologian and
translator of the Catholic Public Domain Version of the Bible.


