Has Iran Begun A Covert Nuclear Breakout? Yes.

I consider it to be very significant that Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad gave a good portion of time, in his speech to the U.N. in September 26th, 2012, to describing the Iranian regime’s view on the End Times. See my post: President of Iran proclaims the End Times near. I believe that Iran may already have one nuclear bomb, and that the speech of the Iranian President was a public proclamation that Iran is about to attempt to initiate the End Times, deliberately, as soon as they obtain a couple more nukes.

Who said the following words?

“Iran’s apocalyptic leaders believe that a medieval holy man will reappear in the wake of a devastating Holy War, thereby ensuring that their brand of radical Islam will rule the earth. That’s not just what they believe. That’s what is actually guiding their policies and their actions.”

It sounds like something that I would write in one of my books on eschatology. But these words were spoken by Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu in his speech to the U.N., one day after the speech of the Iranian President that announced the End Times. Two world leaders, speaking to the nations of the world gathered in NYC, and both spoke about the end times, the apocalypse.

I am convinced that Iran currently possesses a covert uranium gas purification facility, for the following reasons:

1. The Fordow facility near Qom was originally covert.

Netanyahu told the U.N. (27 Sept 2012) that “For over two years, our intelligence agencies didn’t know that Iran was building a huge nuclear enrichment plant under a mountain.” He was referring to Qom (Fordow). Iran wanted a covert purification facility so that they could use it to complete the last step of uranium purification: from 20% to 90%. The facility at Natanz is not covert; it is used to purify uranium to 3.5% and to 20%. A large size facility is needed to produce 3.5% uranium; a medium size facility is sufficient to produce 20% uranium. But only a small facility, with 2000 to 3000 centrifuges, is needed for the last step, from 20% to 90%.

Once Fordow was discovered in 2009, Iran needed to build a new covert facility. But that facility could be much smaller than Natanz, and even smaller than Fordow. The smaller the facility, the easier it is to hide.

2. In 2010, Iran announced that it would build more enrichment facilities.

In August 2010, Iran announced that they intended to build up to 10 new uranium enrichment facilities, and that they would begin building one of these by early 2011. From the ISIS report of 4 June 2012:

Is Iran building a third gas centrifuge enrichment plant? This question has been on the minds of Iran watchers in governments around the world since former Iranian nuclear chief Ali Akbar Salehi claimed on August 16, 2010 that “studies for the location of 10 other uranium enrichment facilities” had ended, and that “the construction of one of these facilities will begin by the end of the (current Iranian) year (March 2011) or start of the next year.” Succeeding nuclear head Fereydoun Abbassi-Davani said in mid-2011 that construction on additional enrichment plants was delayed by two years. Now, one year later, what is the status of a new centrifuge plant in addition to the Natanz and Fordow centrifuge plants? Is the plant still deferred for another year or has Iran changed its mind once again and begun building a third centrifuge plant in secret? It would not be the first time, as witnessed by Iran’s past secret construction of the Natanz centrifuge site, the Kalaye Electric centrifuge research and development plant, and the deeply buried Fordow centrifuge facility.

Why announce to the world that you are going to build more enrichment sites, if you wish a site to be covert? This was necessary as preparation for a cover story, in case the new covert facility were discovered. They could then say that the new facility was not covert. They already announced that they were going to build it. They have also taken the position that they “can delay telling the IAEA about the construction of a nuclear facility until six months before the introduction of nuclear material….” [ISIS 4 June 2012]. So if a covert facility is discovered, they can claim that they were going to tell the IAEA, once they were ready to begin enrichment.

Iran’s mid-2011 claim that “construction on additional enrichment plants was delayed by two years” [ISIS 4 June 2012] could simply be a lie. Iran has publicly stated that they sometimes lie about their enrichment activities:

“In an interview published in the London-based daily Al-Hayat on Thursday, Iranian Vice President Fereydoon Abbasi-Davani, who is also the head of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI), said that misleading facts were used to protect his country’s nuclear program and to disguise some of the technical advances it has made.” (Iran admits it deceived the West over nuclear program)

3. A covert breakout is the only viable option for Iran

The main obstacle to U.S. support for an Israeli military strike on Iran’s known enrichment facilities (Fordow, Natanz) is the U.S. election in Nov. 2012. A military strike, with or without an Iranian response of closing the strait of Hormuz, would panic the oil commodity markets and harm the U.S. economy. It would also raise the specter of an extended war in that region of the world, after two very costly wars: Iraq and Afghanistan. If President Obama wishes to be reelected, there must be no such strike prior to the election.

The Israeli Prime Minister’s support for a strike is well-known. His ‘red line’ (literally and figuratively) was drawn at his 27 Sept 2012 U.N. Speech. It is drawn before Iran obtains enough 20% uranium for a breakout. He stated his belief that Iran may reach that point as early as spring 2013.

But if Iran attempted a non-covert nuclear breakout at any time, by kicking out IAEA inspectors and using Qom and Natanz to make 90% uranium, Israel would certainly strike and the U.S. would likely support them. This danger of a military strike increases after the U.S. election, and it increases again as spring 2013 approaches. A partially successful strike on Natanz alone would shut down Iran’s source of 3.5% uranium for many months or years, and greatly slow the production of 20% uranium. A successful strike on Natanz and a partially successful strike on Fordow would shut down the production of both 3.5% and 20% uranium. Iran cannot take that chance.

Therefore, they must have a covert uranium enrichment facility, which would be their third facility in addition to Fordow and Natanz. They know this. They have spent many years and billions of dollars on their nuclear program. They have the desire and the means and the need for a third covert facility. They are able. It is fitting. Therefore, they have done it.

4. Iran has already diverted enough 20% uranium gas to that third facility for one small nuclear bomb.

As I pointed out in my previous post, if Iran is working toward making a nuclear bomb, every kg of 20% U-235 is precious. They have spent billions of dollars and many years, and they have endured harsh sanctions and the constant threat of a military strike, in order to make 20% uranium. Therefore, it is highly likely that this amount of 96.3 kg of 20% uranium, which Iran claims was blended down or converted to metal (i.e. made unusable for further purification to 90%), was diverted to a covert facility. Deceiving the IAEA inspectors would not be so difficult for a government that has committed billions to their nuclear program. I conclude that Iran has deceived the IAEA, and that this material, the 96.3 kg of 20% uranium, is still destined for the making of a nuclear bomb.

Although ISIS estimates that 20 to 30 kg of weapon-grade uranium metal is needed for one nuke, other experts state that less would be sufficient. The amount diverted, 96.3 kg, is sufficient for one nuclear bomb of about 7 kg uranium metal with a 10 kiloton yield.

How Much Weapon-Grade Uranium does Iran need?
Weapon YieldLevel of Technical Expertise
in kilotonslowmediumhigh
1 kt yield8 kilograms4 kilograms2.5 kilograms
5 kt yield11 kilograms6 kilograms3.5 kilograms
10 kt yield13 kilograms7 kilograms4 kilograms
20 kt yield16 kilograms9 kilograms5 kilograms
Values rounded to nearest 0.5 kilograms
Sources: IranWatch.org, “Iran’s Nuclear Timetable“, updated 6 Sept 2012.
and: Thomas B. Cochran and Christopher E. Paine, “The Amount of Plutonium and Highly Enriched Uranium Needed for Pure Fission Nuclear Weapons,” (Washington, DC: Natural Resources Defense Council, revised April 13, 1995)

5. Iran has already had enough time to convert the diverted 96 kg of 20% uranium gas into 90% uranium metal. Therefore, if a third covert enrichment facility exists, Iran may already have one nuclear bomb.

6. Iran’s current behavior before the world community supports the conclusion that they already have one nuclear bomb.

In his 26 Sept 2012 U.N. speech, the President of Iran spoke about the End Times. He also spoke about the need for a new world order. And the apocalyptic comments with which he closed his speech indicate that this new world order will be achieved, in the view of the Iranian regime, by means of their end times expectation: a great war against the infidels, in which the Muslim nations are led by Iran, and which will hasten the arrival of the 12th Imam, the Mahdi. See my previous post: Radical Shia Eschatology, Iran’s View of the End Times.

They have also spoken as if a U.S./Israeli attack on Iran were only a matter of time, and that the result would be an Iranian attack on both nations. Yes, it is only a matter of time: less than a year, probably less than 6 months, perhaps only weeks.

by
Ronald L. Conte Jr.
Roman Catholic theologian and
translator of the Catholic Public Domain Version of the Bible.

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